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These two linked Discussion Papers seek to provide 
insights into the referendum arrangements, starting 
with an historical overview of the development of 
support amongst Bougainvilleans for the separation 
of Bougainville from PNG. This first paper points to 
emergence of a pan-Bougainvillean identity during the 
20th century and how it was that secession became 
a widely discussed possibility for Bougainville from 
the late 1960s, largely in reaction to decisions of the 
then Australian colonial government to permit the 
establishment of a large-scale mine in Bougainville. 
It then briefly reviews the origins and impacts of 
the Bougainville conflict (1988–97) and highlights 
what is still a little known and understood fact of 
Bougainville history: that the origins of the conflict do 
not lie in the mining-related grievances and actions 
of young landowners from the Panguna mine area, 
but rather in the grievances and actions of a broad 
coalition of Bougainville groups. The existence of such 
a coalition helps to explain the widespread response 
of Bougainvilleans to the violence of the PNG police 
mobile squads between 1988 and 1990, which saw 
the separation of Bougainville from PNG becoming 
the central demand of the Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army (BRA) leadership. 
This paper also considers the divisions that 
developed amongst Bougainvilleans during the conflict 
including divisions about the possibility of secession. 
It touches on the efforts made between 1988 and 
1995 to prevent escalation of the conflict or to end 
the conflict, before turning to the beginnings of the 
Bougainville peace process between 1997 and 1999. In 
particular it discusses the origins and development of 
the Bougainvillean demands for inclusion of provision 
on a referendum on independence in the BPA, and 
The Bougainville Peace Agreement (the BPA)1 is a 
complex agreement, produced by a succession of 
compromises made during more than two years 
of often intense negotiations (June 1999 to August 
2001), directed towards permanently ending a deeply 
divisive violent conflict and generally referred to in 
Bougainville as ‘the crisis’. The agreement sought to 
transform violent conflict through provision of new 
constitutionally provided governance arrangements that 
were acceptable to all the previously divided parties 
that participated in the negotiations. It is significant 
that it is not just the autonomy arrangements that 
provide a new governance framework applicable to 
both Bougainville and the Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
national government. The referendum arrangements 
are also intended to be a part of the new governance 
framework that are in large part designed to allow for 
the peaceful management of disputes that once were 
only dealt with through violent conflict. This is a vitally 
important perspective in relation to the referendum 
given that, as the time when the referendum must 
be held approaches, there are voices both at the 
national level in PNG and amongst pro-secessionist 
Bougainvilleans expressing doubts about aspects of 
what the BPA provides in relation to the referendum. 
Some in Port Moresby are still concerned that the 
existence of the referendum arrangements undermines 
PNG sovereignty, while some in Bougainville 
question the value of a referendum where the national 
parliament retains the right to reject the outcome of 
the referendum, or claim that the referendum is not 
necessary because Bougainville is already independent 
under the unilateral declaration of independence made 
by rebel leader Francis Ona on 17 May 1990. 
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Hamnett 1977). Matriliny means that land and other 
valuable property (and often leadership) descends 
through the matrilineal line, that women tend to be 
seen as custodians of customary land and that they 
sometimes have quite high status within their societies, 
though the extent of this varies between culture and 
language groups. Under customary arrangements, 
however, women tend to have limited decision-
making roles within the family and also tend to play 
limited public roles, with maternal uncles and brothers 
usually speaking on their behalf in public discussions, 
sometimes even on land matters (although women’s 
views on customary land are usually regarded as 
important). It is still far from easy for women to take 
on other public roles in Bougainville, although this 
situation is gradually changing. In part this is because of 
the leadership roles that women took on in the origins 
of the Bougainville peace process (1997–2005) that 
ended the Bougainville conflict, and in part because of 
leadership roles that women are now playing in several 
Bougainville-based non-government organisations 
and as elected representatives in both the Autonomous 
Bougainville Government (ABG) (from 2005) and 
Bougainville’s system of community governments 
established early in 2017 (in which each village assembly 
area elects both a male and a female representative).
While Bougainville was under nominal German 
colonial control from 1884 to 1915, the first colonial 
administrative centre was not established there until 
1905. Hence, the engagement of Bougainville societies 
with the outside world is comparatively recent, 
something which helps to explain the continuing 
importance of pre-colonial social structures, including 
clans. Australia took control from 1914 until PNG’s 
independence in 1975 (with a brief period of 
Japanese control during World War II). Some parts 
of mountainous Bougainville had little contact with 
churches or the colonial regime until after 1945. 
The state in PNG (including Bougainville) has always 
been relatively weak at all levels, with a limited impact on 
local communities and difficulties in imposing policies 
on those determined to oppose them. There were no 
formal pan-Bougainvillean political structures under 
the highly centralised colonial administrative structure 
until very late in the colonial period. Indeed, elected 
local-level governments were only established gradually 
from the late 1950s onwards, and in some areas were 
resented and resisted (Connell 1977; Griffin 1977). 
The first pan-Bougainville political structures were 
how a significantly modified version of those demands 
was eventually included in the final version of the 
BPA, signed almost 17 years ago on 30 August 2001. 
This historical analysis provides the background to the 
second Discussion Paper, which surveys the intent, 
content and implementation (to date) of the referendum 
arrangements contained in both the BPA and the PNG 
constitutional laws that give effect to the BPA.
Development of a distinct and unifying 
Bougainville identity
PNG and Bougainville
Bougainville’s population in 2018 is approximately 
300,000, less than 4 per cent of PNG’s total population. 
Its 9438 square kilometres constitutes roughly 2 per 
cent of PNG’s total land area. With 25 languages and 
a similar number of sublanguages and dialects (Tryon 
2005), and many cultural differences even within the 
larger language groups (Ogan 2005), Bougainville 
reflects PNG’s pattern of linguistic and cultural 
diversity. While in many ways Bougainville societies 
are close culturally and linguistically to those in the 
west of the neighbouring Solomon Islands, it is also 
true that many features of Bougainvillean cultures are 
similar to those found elsewhere in PNG as well as in 
other countries of the Melanesian cultural area. The 
most distinctive feature shared by most (but not all) 
Bougainvilleans is very dark skin colour, noticeably 
darker than most (though not all) people from other 
parts of PNG.
Pre-colonial Bougainvilleans were organised mainly 
around tiny, stateless, clan-based societies. Despite major 
social and economic changes since colonial ‘rule’ began 
in the late 19th century, the most significant social 
groups in Bougainville today continue to be nuclear and 
extended families, the localised clan-based landowning 
lineages to which members of those families belong 
(typically containing 50–150 members), and flexible 
groupings of such lineages. These structures continue to 
be heavily influenced by customary arrangements that 
remain strong today despite many significant changes 
in Bougainville society associated with the colonial and 
post-colonial eras.
A minority of societies have hereditary (‘chiefly’) 
leadership, with the rest largely built around 
performance-based leadership often with a hereditary 
element. Most societies are matrilineal, but at the same 
time tend to be quite patriarchal (Eves et al. 2018; 
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development of one of the world’s largest copper and 
gold mines in the mountains of central Bougainville 
from the mid-1960s, under Australian colonial rule. 
The mine was seen by many Bougainvilleans as 
imposed by the colonial authority for the benefit of the 
rest of colonial PNG with little regard to detrimental 
social and environmental impacts on Bougainville 
itself. There was particular resentment of the limited 
land rents and compensation and the fact that they 
were paid only to communities whose land was actually 
used for mining-related purposes, with no regard for 
the impact of mining on other communities (Regan 
2017). The mine operated from April 1972 until 
violent conflict closed it in 1989; it has not reopened. 
While resented by many, economic activity associated 
with the mine together with widespread plantation 
and smallholder cocoa and copra production made 
Bougainville PNG’s wealthiest province before the 
conflict. It was, however, wealth based on significant 
inequality (Regan 2017:364–66), a factor which 
undoubtedly contributed to the origins of the conflict.
Background to secessionist demands
Early evidence of secessionism
Both Conyers (1976:53) and Mamak and Bedford 
indicate that the possibility of secession had been 
discussed in some areas of Bougainville for many 
years before the first recorded Bougainville secession 
demands that emerged in the late 1960s in the context 
of both development of the mine and the approach of 
independence, both of which raised expectations and 
opportunities for change. A September 1968 meeting 
of a group of 25 Bougainvilleans living in Port Moresby 
‘called for a referendum in Bougainville on its political 
future’ (Griffin et al. 1979:152; Mamak and Bedford 
1974:8–10). A spokesman for the group, Leo Hannett, 
issued a statement requesting that the proposed 
referendum be held by 1970 ‘to decide whether 
Bougainville should be independent, should unite with 
the Solomon Islands to constitute a separate unit, or 
should remain with PNG’ (Premdas 1977: 76).
The September 1968 call for a referendum saw 
secession become widely discussed amongst emerging 
educated Bougainvillean leaders, who then sought 
to convey their perspectives to other local leaders, 
making deliberate efforts to communicate with local 
government council leaders through the Bougainville 
combined councils meetings. Most of the educated 
the combined councils conference established in 1963, 
followed by the interim provincial government set up 
in early1974 and given a constitutional basis in 1977 
as part of a settlement of Bougainville’s first attempted 
secession in late 1975 (Ghai and Regan 2006). A group 
of young educated Bougainvilleans took the lead in the 
1973 debates about establishing the interim provincial 
government. They were supported by John Momis, then 
a Bougainvillean member of the House of Assembly 
(the colonial legislature), who was de facto chair of the 
PNG constitutional planning committee that proposed 
a system of devolution to provincial governments to 
be included in the independence constitution (Ballard 
1981; Conyers 1976; Regan 1997a).
Identities among Bougainvilleans and pan-
Bougainville identity
While trade networks undoubtedly linked various 
Bougainvillean groups before colonialism (see, for 
example, Specht 1974; Wickler 1990), most societies 
probably had little sense of Bougainville as a whole. 
Group identities were probably multiple, and were 
often related to environmental and other localized 
factors (Regan 2005:423–24). A pan-Bougainvillean 
sense of identity was created only from the early 20th 
century, initially as a response to plantation colonialism 
which brought about the first extensive interactions of 
Bougainvilleans with people from elsewhere in PNG, 
with dark skin colour becoming the primary marker of 
that identity (Nash and Ogan 1990). Bougainvilleans 
were regarded by the German colonisers as particularly 
fierce and they were valued as policemen and as 
providers of security on plantations. Nash and Ogan 
(1990) argue that in carrying out such roles, many 
developed a sense of the superiority of black-skinned 
Bougainvilleans over the lighter (‘red skin’) people that 
they were often supervising. 
Politicisation of this new pan-Bougainville identity 
developed after World War II. Contributing factors to 
this new politicisation included continued close links 
to Solomon Islands (reinforced by the links of the two 
main Christian churches in Bougainville with ‘parent’ 
houses in Solomon Islands), grievances against the 
colonial regime for neglect of economic development in 
Bougainville (Griffin et al 1979:150), and the racism of 
some planters and colonial officials (Ogan 1965, 1971, 
1972). However, the strongest factor to drive identity 
politicisation was Bougainvillean reaction to the 
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In late 1975, [PNG Prime Minister] Somare 
sent a delegation of cabinet ministers and other 
political personnel to ascertain the extent of 
secessionist sentiments … Everywhere they went, 
even in the northern parts of the island, they 
were met by large crowds, effectively destroying 
all lingering illusions that Bougainvilleans were 
undecided or divided on their demands for 
secession (Premdas 1977:80).
Despite the existence of strong secessionist feeling, 
the Bougainville leadership was quite moderate. There 
was limited violence, the main exceptions occurring in 
January 1976 when ‘secessionists destroyed government 
property and buildings and tore up airstrips in the 
northern and southern parts of the troubled island’ and 
then in June when the PNG government ‘dispatched 
a riot police squad (sic) to southern Bougainville 
to evacuate the staff of Buin High School (which 
had been the scene of considerable disturbances a 
month before)’ (Laracy 1991:55). Recognition from 
the international community for Bougainville’s 
independence was not forthcoming and, after a failed 
effort to gain support from the United Nations for 
secession, negotiations between PNG and Bougainville 
developed and continued for about six months 
(Momis 2005:312–14). In mid-1976 an agreement was 
reached for constitutionalised autonomy, generalised 
to the whole of PNG through a system of provincial 
governments coupled with what was in effect special 
financial arrangements for Bougainville, the only PNG 
province at that time where a large-scale mining project 
was located. Its provincial government was to receive 
a guaranteed share of mining revenue through receipt 
of 95 per cent of the mineral royalties which until then 
had been paid by the mining company to the PNG 
government. (The other 5 per cent was already payable 
to the landowners of the mine lease area.)
Support for secession calmed after 1976, but never 
died. The provincial government system was initially 
widely accepted as a substitute for independence. There 
was, however, a gradual loss of faith as many people 
realised that Bougainville’s provincial government had 
limited authority over matters of central concern to 
Bougainvilleans and in particular, mining, land and 
internal migration. By the mid-to-late 1980s there 
was a growing but by no means universal sense that 
it had been a mistake for Bougainville to abandon the 
leaders probably saw their demands for secession as 
part of a strategy to gain autonomy for Bougainville 
within new PNG constitutional arrangements 
that would possibly come with independence.2 
Nevertheless the constant discussion of the topic led 
to widespread interest in secession as a solution to 
what were seen as a range of problems affecting late 
colonial Bougainville, and especially mining-related 
problems. A new political organisation established in 
the Kieta area in 1969, Napidakoe Navitu, was openly 
secessionist and in 1970 attempted to stage its own 
‘referendum on secessionism’ although it was ‘a fiasco’ 
(Griffin et al. 1979:153; Mamak and Bedford 1974:9–10). 
In March 1971 Paul Lapun, one of Bougainville’s 
three representatives in the House of Assembly and 
Chairman of Napidakoe Navitu, ‘unsuccessfully 
introduced a Bill … calling for a referendum among 
Bougainvilleans to determine whether the island 
should be independent’ (Premdas 1977:68).
The first Bougainville unilateral declaration of 
independence
Secessionist feeling intensified in the aftermath of the 
killing in the eastern highlands in December 1972 
of two senior Bougainvillean public servants who 
had been involved in a car accident in which a small 
child was killed. The educated leadership, however, 
gradually shifted the focus of debate to autonomy for 
Bougainville within PNG as their preferred approach 
to gaining a share of mining revenue and for dealing 
with Bougainville’s broader needs. In late 1973, PNG 
reluctantly agreed to an ‘interim’ Bougainville provincial 
government (Ballard 1981; Conyers 1976:53–64; 
Mamak and Bedford 1974:18; Somare 1975:114–22). In 
1974 and 1975 tensions developed over the demand 
by Bougainville’s unelected Interim Provincial 
Government for a share of mining revenue. That 
dispute, and the move by then Chief Minister Somare 
in July 1974 to remove the constitutional arrangements 
for provincial government from the independence 
constitution, resulted in the Bougainville leadership 
making a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) 
with effect from 1 September 1975, just days before 
PNG’s independence. The secessionists were initially 
dismissed in Port Moresby as a minority that was 
strongly opposed in the north of Bougainville. But as 
Premdas observes:
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Bougainville Gregory Singkai and several outspoken 
priests on the impacts of mining.
Although these groups had differing agendas 
and objectives, all were concerned in various ways 
about the impacts of the mine, and sought a far fairer 
mining agreement. Some of them, and notably the 
leadership of the Bana Pressure Group3, saw secession 
as an important goal, but it was not a generalised 
one until the unifying experience of the PNG police 
mobile squad’s violence made secession the key goal 
of what quickly became a wider uprising. Ona became 
the main leader of the coalition of groups, because 
he was a member of most of the groups involved 
but also because he was a strong personality with 
a particularly strong sense of grievance about the 
impacts of the mining company Bougainville Copper 
Ltd (BCL). Much of Ona’s grievance related to internal 
family problems that saw him and his family excluded 
from distribution of BCL payments of land rents and 
compensation (Regan 2017:386–88; Roka 2014:23–26). 
The November 1988 destruction of some mine 
property was the spark to a wider conflict. It involved, 
amongst other things, explosions that brought down 
power lines supplying power to the Panguna mine 
site. These were actions carried out by members of the 
Bana Pressure Group, contrary to most reports which 
attribute the action to young mine area landowners. 
The destruction of mine property was intended to put 
pressure on the mining company and both the national 
and Bougainville provincial governments to negotiate 
new mining arrangements. However, contrary to 
expectations of the Bougainville groups involved, their 
actions were almost immediately treated as a law and 
order issue, and police mobile squads were deployed 
from elsewhere in PNG. It was the indiscriminate 
police violence, initially mainly against communities in 
the areas around the mine but later on a broader basis, 
that quickly transformed the conflict into a generalised 
uprising, changing the key demands of the leadership 
away from mining-related grievances to secession. 
Secession soon became the central demand of the 
newly established and very loosely structured BRA, of 
which Francis Ona was the leader. Again, contrary to 
most reports, the BRA originated not amongst young 
Panguna landowners, but in members or associates of 
the Bana Pressure Group.4 It soon expanded, however, 
to include members from most parts of Bougainville. 
Key BRA personnel actively recruited members of 
Bougainvillean criminal gangs in the belief that they 
secessionist cause in 1976 (Ghai and Regan 2006:295–96; 
Regan 2017; Tanis 2005).
The conflict and the second unilateral 
declaration of independence
These concerns contributed to a conflict beginning in 
late 1988 as new Bougainvillean leadership emerged 
that challenged the mining company, the national 
government and Bougainville’s provincial government 
over not only the distribution of mine revenue but 
also concerns about social and environmental impacts 
of mining. In general the coalition of groups did not 
seek an end to mining, but rather sought a radical new 
regime that included considerably increased flows 
of revenue to mine-impacted communities and to 
Bougainville’s provincial government (Regan 2017). 
While this new leadership was widely reported at the 
time, and has been discussed ever since, as involving 
mainly young mine area landowners led by Francis 
Ona, in fact there was a coalition of groups involved, 
the existence of which helps to explain how it was that 
the initial demands relating to mining were rapidly 
transformed into a generalised separatist uprising. This 
coalition emerged in 1987–88 and included: 
• some younger generation landowners from the 
mine lease areas 
• young Bougainvillean mine workers, who came 
from many parts of Bougainville
• members of the broadly representative Arawa 
Mungkas Association (see Mamak and 
Bedord 1974:13–17 for discussion of an earlier 
manifestation of the Mungkas Association) 
• members of radical ‘pressure groups’, mainly from 
the Bana and Siwai areas of south-west Bougainville 
• members of criminal gangs recruited by leaders 
of other groups once police violence was being 
widely used 
• indigenous political–religious groups such as 
Me‘ekamui Pontoku Onoring, led by Damien 
Dameng (Regan 2017). 
Most of the leadership of these groups were adherents 
of the Catholic church, and they got strong support 
from some Catholic church leaders, a fact that greatly 
added to the legitimacy of the coalition in Catholic-
dominated Bougainville (Regan 2017:368–69, 383–84). 
The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission was 
a consistent voice of criticism of mining-related 
injustices (see Kigina 1984) as was the then Bishop of 
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in Buka in September 1990. Former BRA elements 
loyal to such leaders then began actively assisting 
PNG forces, in time becoming part of the loosely 
structured Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF). These 
developments established patterns of conflict that 
persisted until 1997. Terrible violence was unleashed 
through this internal Bougainville conflict, and at least 
some of this violence was modelled on and legitimised 
by the violence Bougainvilleans had experienced at the 
hands of the PNG security forces.
The conflict took on three distinct but overlapping 
dimensions. First, the BRA pursued independence and 
fought the returning PNG forces, gradually gaining the 
upper hand, at least from about 1994. Second, the BRA 
also fought elements of the BRF. The BRF leadership 
tended to oppose independence, but mainly because of 
fear of what exclusive BRA control of an independent 
Bougainville might mean rather than because of 
principled opposition to independence. The third 
dimension of the conflict involved highly localised 
conflicts over land, relationships and other family and 
community level causes, often but not always involving 
local BRA and BRF elements. All three dimensions of 
the conflict were violent and divisive and often gave 
rise to fluid and shifting relationships between groups 
at the local level.
Impacts of the conflict
The impacts of the conflict were severe. Varying 
estimates of the numbers of conflict-related deaths 
have been made, from 3000 up to 20,000.5 Given 
that Bougainville’s population immediately before 
the conflict was about 150,000, and that between 
10,000 to 15,000 left Bougainville as a result of the 
conflict during 1989 and the first half of 1990, then 
even 3000 deaths was an appalling outcome. This 
figure includes perhaps 1000 or more from conflict, 
including both Bougainvilleans and several hundred 
PNGDF and police personnel. In addition, there were 
many extrajudicial killings by all groups involved in 
the conflict, as well as an unknown number of deaths 
caused or contributed to by the PNG blockade of 
BRA controlled areas. These deaths, and the many 
more injuries that occurred, caused grave trauma 
for Bougainville. Another source of anguish was the 
displacement of 60,000 people from their hamlets and 
villages to displaced persons camps, called care centres. 
Deep divisions amongst Bougainvillean communities 
would be more ready than most to respond to the 
violence of the police mobile squads. 
The PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) was deployed 
in April 1989, but to no avail, and its personnel too 
became involved in generalised violent action against 
the non-combatant population (Liria 1993). Closure 
of the mine was pursued as a goal, but Ona and the 
leaders around him also envisaged the mine being 
reopened as the major source of revenue for an 
independent Bougainville, provided it operated under 
a new dispensation, far fairer to impacted communities 
(Regan 2017). The mine did close in May 1989 and 
in March 1990 PNG forces (both police and PNGDF) 
withdrew from Bougainville under a ceasefire. 
In May 1990 Francis Ona made Bougainville’s 
second UDI although, again, international recognition 
of Bougainville’s independence was not forthcoming. 
Soon after the UDI was announced, PNG imposed a 
sea and air blockade of Bougainville that continued 
until late 1994. Bougainville’s provincial government 
was suspended in mid-1990 and remained suspended 
until it was reestablished as the Bougainville 
Transitional Government in early 1995.
Intra-Bougainville conflict
Internal divisions amongst Bougainvilleans developed 
rapidly in the wake of the departure of PNG forces in 
March 1990. Factors involved included the very loose 
structures of the BRA and the presence in its ranks 
of many criminals. A significant contributing factor 
was the BRA standing orders issued by Ona, which 
invited action against suspected PNG agents as well as 
sorcerers, orders that provided the motivation for many 
targeted attacks based more on localised jealousies and 
conflicts than on any real need for action. Another 
factor in emergence of conflict was the strong localised 
identities of Bougainville (Regan 2005), with much of 
this conflict reflecting longstanding sources of division. 
A pan-Bougainville identity and the development of 
political demands associated with that identity had 
been able to unite Bougainvilleans when there was a 
national government and an international mining giant 
present to oppose. In the absence of both of them, 
localised identities took precedence and were often a 
factor in conflict on the island. 
By the latter part of 1990 leaders of some local 
communities threatened by localised conflict actively 
supported the return of PNG forces, which began 
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and achieving peace (see, for example, PNG 1992). 
Although there were hopeful signs associated with 
some of the initiatives, they all failed to prevent the 
violence or achieve peace for a variety of reasons. This 
is not to say that these efforts were a waste of time, as 
cumulative lessons were learnt through those attempts 
(see Regan 2010:141–42). From late 1995, however, 
a number of factors interacted to create the political 
space within which a successful peace process was 
able to emerge. A major factor was the resurrection 
of Bougainville’s provincial government in early 1995, 
now called the Bougainville Transitional Government 
(BTG) which, under the leadership of lawyer Theodore 
Miriung, became focused on finding solutions to the 
conflict. In late 1995 these efforts culminated in little-
known talks held in Cairns, Australia, between the BTG 
and BRF leaders on one side, and BIG and BRA leaders 
on the other, in which for the first time moderate 
leaders on both sides engaged and explored possible 
ways ahead. 
Unfortunately, a PNGDF ambush of BIG/BRA 
leaders returning to Bougainville from the December 
1995 talks resulted in a hiatus and was followed by a 
significant escalation of military activity by the PNGDF 
in 1996. These increased PNGDF efforts were, however, 
singularly unsuccessful. The failure of PNGDF action 
was a significant part of the motivation by the PNG 
government for ultimately unsuccessful efforts from 
late 1996 to engage mercenaries in an effort to defeat 
the BRA, known as the Sandline affair (Dinnen et al. 
1987; Dorney 1998; O’Callaghan 1998). Paradoxically, 
however, the Sandline affair resulted in a change of 
attitude on the part of the BIG/BRA leadership. The 
failed PNG effort to engage the Sandline mercenaries 
led the BIG/BRA leadership to consider the risks of 
a significant new and unpredictable escalation in the 
conflict, and the role of the PNGDF in ousting the 
Sandline personnel contributed to senior BRA and BIG 
leaders assessing the PNGDF in a more sympathetic 
light than had hitherto been possible (Regan 1997b). 
At the same time, the Sandline affair added to what 
was already steadily growing pressure from the 
international community on PNG to move away from 
use of military force to resolve the conflict, towards use 
of political processes.
In any event, a peace process developed in mid-
1997, initiated by moderate Bougainvillean leaders 
on both sides of the conflict who had become deeply 
concerned about the potential long-term impacts of 
arising from the conflict led to further trauma. Other 
impacts included destruction of virtually all public 
infrastructure and private sector productive assets, 
and destruction of the capacity of both Bougainville’s 
provincial government and of national government 
agencies previously operating in Bougainville. For 
PNG, the deaths and injuries suffered by many PNGDF 
and police personnel was also deeply traumatic and 
contributed to significant loss of morale in both 
organisations. Further, the closure and loss of revenue 
from the Panguna mine had deleterious impacts on the 
PNG economy.
The extent of the divisions amongst 
Bougainvilleans was manifested in the establishment 
of opposing government structures: a Bougainville 
Interim Government (BIG) associated with the BRA, 
and from early 1995 the Bougainville Transitional 
Government (BTG) which was quite closely associated 
with the BRF (a nominated member represented the 
BRF in the government). 
Amongst the BRA personnel and the extensive 
support base it enjoyed in many Bougainvillean 
communities, PNG was seen as at fault due to its 
actions in the origins of the conflict, and in particular 
the indiscriminate violence wrought by the police 
mobile squads, and later by the PNGDF. Many felt deep 
bitterness towards the PNG state. As a result, the cause 
of independence from PNG became a deeply held core 
belief for many Bougainvilleans. Those views tend to 
remain little changed by the almost 17 years that have 
elapsed since the BPA was signed. So deep was the 
conviction of pro-secessionists that they developed 
their own explanations for why BRF members and 
other Bougainvilleans opposed secession, which 
included a widespread belief that the support of BRF 
members and other pro-PNG leaders was being bought 
by PNGDF payments to the individuals concerned.
On the other hand, the experience of not only 
the chaotic internal conflict that began after the PNG 
forces withdrew, but also the subsequent localised 
conflict, led to many Bougainvilleans opposing 
independence, especially if it were to be under a BRA-
dominated government.
The peace process
From as early as late 1988, various initiatives were 
directed to either preventing the violence (in the 
early stages of the conflict) or ending the violence 
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intra-Bougainville divisions emerged in the early stages 
of the peace process. Francis Ona and the minority 
of BRA elements who supported him was one such 
division as Ona opposed the peace process, claiming 
that Bougainville was already independent as a result 
of the May 1990 UDI. While Ona did not have enough 
armed supporters to disrupt the peace process, his 
strident support for Bougainville secession put strong 
pressure on the BRA leadership who were involved in 
the peace process. It also gave them useful arguments 
for the negotiations with PNG — they were able to 
claim with a high degree of credibility that they had 
limited room to move for fear of losing popular support 
to Ona. (For more on this aspect of the ‘new’ divisions, 
see Regan 2010:47–50).
A second source of division related to the 
significant difficulties experienced in establishing the 
Bougainville Reconciliation Government under the 
Lincoln Agreement of January 1998. These difficulties 
saw three of Bougainville’s four MPs, together with 
leaders of Buka’s council of elders and some BRF 
elements, refusing to work with the mainstream 
Bougainville leaders supporting the peace process. 
In fact, they boycotted the May 1999 elections of the 
Bougainville People’s Congress (which was designated 
as the Bougainville Reconciliation Government 
envisaged by the Lincoln Agreement) and the initial 
negotiations for the political agreement in June 1999. 
With the BRF and integrationist support more generally 
concentrated in particular areas, especially the large 
island of Buka and the northern part of Bougainville 
Island, there were serious risks of long-term geographic 
divisions emerging from the peace process. Indeed, 
a Tok Pisin slogan often used by a key Buka leader at 
this time was Sapos Bogenvil I bruk lus lo PNG, Buka 
bai bruk lus lo Bogenvil (If Bougainville secedes from 
PNG, then Buka will secede from Bougainville.) The 
split in this case emerged in December 1998. It then 
took almost 12 months before the dissidents and the 
leadership of the Bougainville People’s Congress were 
able to agree to work together. (For more on this 
second aspect of ‘new’ intra-Bougainville divisions, see 
Regan 2010:50–52.)
the intensifying divisions amongst Bougainvilleans. 
They were supported by the New Zealand government, 
which provided the venue and some mediation for 
a series of meetings from mid-1997 to January 1998 
(Adams 2001; Hayes 2005; Mortlock 2005). The peace 
process involved three main stages. The first was 
from mid-1997 to mid-1999, and mainly comprised 
efforts to build trust between previously opposing 
and still deeply distrustful groups. To that end, the 
Lincoln Agreement (one of three main agreements 
reached in the first seven months of the process) 
provided for the establishing of a single Bougainville 
Reconciliation Government, intended to bring together 
the previously opposing Bougainville governments, the 
BIG and the BTG. In this first phase, an international 
intervention was also developed through agreement 
between the opposing Bougainville groups and the 
PNG government. It comprised two main components. 
One was an unarmed regional group of personnel from 
four countries which monitored first a truce and later 
a ceasefire (the New Zealand-led Truce Monitoring 
Group from November 1997 to March 1998, then the 
Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group from April 
1998 to June 2003). The second component was the 
establishment of a small United Nations (UN) observer 
mission, supplied by the UN Department of Political 
Affairs, which operated from mid-1998 to June 2005. 
The second phase of the process, from 30 June 
1999 to 30 August 2001, was the negotiations for a 
political settlement to the conflict. The differences 
amongst the Bougainville factions, in particular, had 
been too deep to allow for negotiations before June 
1999. The third phase, from August 2001, involved 
the implementation of the BPA. The initial steps were 
drafting the PNG constitutional laws that give effect 
to the BPA, the development between September 2002 
and November 2004 of the Bougainville constitution 
under which the ABG was established in June 2005, 
and the implementation of the three-stage weapons 
disposal plan contained in the BPA. In many ways 
the implementation of the BPA has continued ever 
since August 2001, with the steps currently under 
way to prepare for the referendum on Bougainville’s 
independence being just the latest stage in the 
implementation process.
While the first phase of the peace process was 
directed at bringing the deeply divided parties closer 
together, the divisions, especially those between 
Bougainvilleans, were still intense, so much so that new 
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were serious differences amongst the Bougainville 
leadership on secession. So in the process of intra-
Bougainville negotiations that preceded negotiations 
with PNG, the secessionists reluctantly accepted a 
referendum on independence as a democratic basis 
for making such a step, but wanted it held as early as 
possible (such as within 3 to 5 years) and demanded 
that its outcome be mandatory. Other Bougainvillean 
groups were open to a referendum being held, but 
feared domination by armed BRA groups if an early 
referendum occurred before reconciliations were held 
and normalcy returned. So they argued for deferral of 
the proposed referendum for a longer period, to allow 
for reconciliation and for disposal of weapons. Some 
other Bougainvillean groups were initially opposed to 
anything other than Bougainville continuing to be a 
part of PNG, but with a high degree of autonomy. It 
was difficult to reach a common Bougainville position 
on this as well as other contentious issues. 
In an impressive process that has been described 
elsewhere (Regan 2002; Regan 2010:85-88) the 
combined leadership in the Bougainville People’s 
Congress reached such a compromise which:
involved those supporting independence 
dropping their demands for early independence 
and instead agreeing to deal with that issue 
through a referendum … but deferred to allow 
time for divided Bougainvilleans to reconcile … 
On the basis that those supporting integration 
would agree to support the holding of the 
referendum, the secessionists agreed to support 
the high autonomy for Bougainville preferred by 
the integrationists (Ghai and Regan 2006:597).
The referendum would be held within six to eight 
years and the outcome would not only be binding on 
both PNG and Bougainville, but would apply to the 
whole of Bougainville irrespective of whether particular 
areas voted differently from the majority.
As they considered incorporating these 
compromises into a ‘common Bougainville negotiating 
position’ being prepared for the first negotiating session 
with the PNG government on 30 June 1999, a major 
concern was how to avoid the risk that a referendum 
might cause conflict if a substantial minority was left 
dissatisfied by the outcome. The particular concern was 
Buka and parts of north Bougainville where opposition 
to the BRA was strongest. As a result, the initial 
common negotiating position proposed that:
The referendum in the Bougainville Peace 
Agreement
The combined Bougainville negotiating position
To understand the quite complex referendum 
arrangements in the BPA, and in particular the reasons 
why it provides for deferral of the referendum for 
10 to 15 years after the Autonomous Bougainville 
Government (ABG) was established and why the 
referendum outcome is not binding on PNG, it is 
necessary to consider the origins of the BPA in the 
more than two years of negotiations that occurred in 
the second phase of the peace process, between June 
1999 and August 2001. 
The negotiations for the BPA actually involved 
two separate negotiations. The first was an intra-
Bougainville negotiation in May and June 1999, 
intended to find a compromise between the divided 
Bougainvilleans. That first stage resulted in the joint 
leadership in the Bougainville People’s Congress 
developing a combined Bougainville negotiating 
position (Regan 2002), which they took into the second 
series of negotiations which lasted more than two years 
between Bougainville and PNG, from 30 June 1999 
to 30 August 2001. Although the three Bougainville 
MPs, some BRF leaders and some Buka leaders were 
not part of these intra-Bougainville negotiations, 
they subsequently accepted the combined negotiation 
position when they reconciled with the Bougainville 
People’s Congress in November 1999.
The election of the Bougainville People’s Congress 
in May 1999 saw pro-secession and pro-integration 
leaders sitting together in the one institution for 
the first time. Developing the compromise ‘united 
Bougainville negotiating position’ was not easy. Up 
until that point the secessionist leaders had had very 
little appreciation of the degree of suspicion of them 
and their goals on the part of many of the BTG and 
BRF leaders. The BIG and BRA leaders to that point 
had been arguing that Bougainville should pursue the 
earliest possible independence, and the fear on the BTG 
and BRF side was that the BIG and BRA leadership 
might seek to dominate an independent Bougainville, 
seeking to exclude all others. 
In the first few months of 1999, however, the split 
in the leadership supporting the peace process and 
the boycott of the Bougainville People’s Congress 
by the three MPs and other leaders had brought 
home to the secessionist leaders the fact that there 
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of the director of the United Nations Observer Mission 
on Bougainville in chairing negotiations and mediating 
when he could, by late 2000, differences over the 
referendum resulted in stalemate in the negotiations. 
Tensions were high and a breakdown in the peace 
process seemed quite possible. 
The referendum compromise, December 2000
It was an Australian government intervention in 
December 2000 that broke the deadlock. This mediation 
was possible only because of a little known but highly 
significant change in Australian policy in relation 
to Bougainville, announced in January 2000 by then 
Australian High Commissioner to PNG, Nick Warner. 
The previous policy position had emphasised Australia’s 
respect for PNG’s territorial integrity, with Bougainville 
regarded as an integral part of PNG (a view that 
caused grave concern to pro-secession Bougainvillean 
leaders, committed as they were to self-determination 
for Bougainville). The new position was that Australia 
‘would accept and support a political solution 
negotiated by the parties’ (Downer 2001:33–34).
This major policy change was largely the outcome 
of the close engagement of Australia in the peace 
process, especially (but not only) through its leadership, 
from early 1998, of the regional Peace Monitoring 
Group (Breen 2016; Regan 2010:65–71; Wehner and 
Denoon 2001). This engagement had helped the 
Australian government better understand not only the 
depth of feeling underlying Bougainville’s demands 
in the negotiations and the difficulties involved in 
bridging the gap between PNG and Bougainville 
positions, but also the difficulties in Australia playing 
neutral peace monitoring or mediation roles if it was 
seen as having a predetermined position, supporting 
one side on the most divisive issue: Bougainville 
independence. Many Bougainvilleans blamed 
Australia for the conflict because it had authorised the 
establishment of the Panguna mine and also blamed 
Australia for its support to the PNGDF during the 
conflict. Consequently, any suggestion that Australia 
was favouring the PNG side in the negotiations tended 
to undermine any claim to Australian neutrality.
The then Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Alexander Downer, made his compromise proposal 
on the referendum arrangements in the course of 
visits first to Bougainville and then to Port Moresby 
in December 2000. His advice on the issues involved 
• a vote of two-thirds or more of the Bougainville 
electorate would be conclusive
• a vote of between 55 per cent and two thirds would 
be conclusive only if approved by a two-thirds 
absolute majority vote of the Bougainville legislature
• in case of either a vote between 55 per cent and 
two-thirds where the Bougainville legislature did 
not approve, or a majority vote of less than 55 per 
cent, a further referendum could be held at a time 
determined by the Bougainville legislature.
The precedent of influence here was the 1998 
Noumea Accord negotiated for New Caledonia, under 
which as many as three referendums on independence 
can be held if the first does not result in a majority vote 
for independence. 
In addition, the Bougainville side asserted that 
a vote in such a referendum should not only be 
binding on both PNG and Bougainville, but also be 
binding on all parts of Bougainville (if the majority 
vote in Bougainville was to be for independence, then 
a vote against independence in a particular part of 
Bougainville would not provide a basis for that part 
to remain within PNG, a provision proposed with 
particular reference to Buka).
From the outset of the negotiations between 
Bougainville and PNG, the PNG side opposed a 
referendum on independence, seeing that as an 
affront to its sovereignty (Regan 2010:59) and likely to 
establish a dangerous precedent for other parts of PNG, 
especially those where there had been a history of 
micro-nationalist movements (see May 1982), as well as 
a threat to Bougainvilleans opposed to independence. 
In the first few months of negotiations for the BPA, it 
became apparent to the Bougainville negotiators that, 
quite apart from the general concern that the PNG side 
had with a referendum, PNG had particular problems 
with the possibility that there could be more than one 
referendum. In the interests of seeking compromise on 
the referendum, the proposals for special majorities and 
a possible second referendum were dropped.
The negotiations for the BPA occurred in 23 
sessions varying in length from a day to a month, held 
over more than two years (June 1999–August 2001). 
The differences between the PNG and Bougainville 
parties over the referendum were extensive and 
extremely difficult to resolve. Indeed, in the early stages 
of negotiations the PNG side sought to avoid discussion 
of the issue. When the issue was raised, differences 
between the sides dominated. Despite the best efforts 
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was. In doing so they conceded that the referendum 
alone would not decide the independence issue. 
Serious concerns about that change were 
considerably reduced by what was seen as an assurance 
provided by Downer’s arguments in favour of the 
compromise. He pointed to the precedent of East Timor, 
saying that although the outcome of its 1999 referendum 
was not binding on Indonesia, once an overwhelming 
majority of East Timorese voted in favour of 
independence the international community ensured that 
the vote was honoured. The Bougainville negotiators saw 
this argument as an assurance of the same international 
community support should there be similar outcome 
when the Bougainville referendum was held. 
As for PNG, by this late stage of the negotiations for 
a political agreement it was becoming clear that there 
would be no agreement without including a referendum 
on independence; the depth of pro-secession feeling 
was clear. PNG conceded a referendum while getting 
the right of final decision on the outcome. Downer 
assured PNG that its sovereignty was protected if the 
outcome was not binding and ultimate authority rested 
with the PNG parliament. In doing so, PNG leaders 
took the view that Australia would support PNG’s 
authority if it were to reject a referendum vote in favour 
of independence. 
Combining autonomy and a deferred referendum
As discussed briefly already, a key assumption of the 
proposal for inclusion in the political settlement of 
the combination of constitutionalised asymmetrical 
autonomy arrangements and a deferred but non-
binding referendum on independence was that it would 
offer PNG the opportunity to persuade even pro-
secession Bougainvilleans on the long-term advantages 
of remaining part of PNG. The most obvious example 
of such an approach in the region was the way that 
France was implementing the Matignon Accord 
(1988) and the Noumea Accord (1998) in relation to 
New Caledonia’s political future by ensuring that a 
programmed approach was followed, not only in the 
irreversible transfer of powers but also the adequate 
flow of resources to New Caledonia.
However there are some aspects of the Bougainville 
arrangements that perhaps militated against PNG 
following the example of France. In particular, the 
outcome of the referendum in New Caledonia is 
binding, whereas that will not be the case with 
came from High Commissioner Warner and his first 
secretary responsible for Bougainville matters, Sarah 
Storey. Downer proposed that the parties should 
agree to a constitutionally guaranteed referendum, 
deferred for a longer period than Bougainville 
had hitherto proposed — 10 to 15 years after an 
autonomous Bougainville government was established. 
Most importantly, the referendum outcome should 
not be binding, but rather would become a matter 
for consultation between the parties, with the PNG 
parliament having ultimate decision-making authority. 
The Australian proposal was intended to remove 
the immediate sources of tension over the question 
of a referendum. The first dimension of the proposal 
— deferral of the decision on the most contentious 
issue for an extended period — aimed to give the 
parties the opportunity to build trust and reach a 
better understanding through the operation of the 
autonomy arrangements (already largely agreed by 
December 2000). For its part, PNG was being offered 
the opportunity to manage its relationship with 
Bougainville in such a way as to gradually reduce 
division and bitterness, and in doing so reduce support 
for independence. The assumption was that PNG 
would grasp the opportunity to make the autonomy 
arrangements work so well (for example, through 
financial support, transfer of powers, capacity building) 
that even many pro-secessionists might be persuaded to 
vote against secession. 
The second dimension to the compromise was to 
significantly reduce the salience of the referendum. 
Instead of being decisive on the issue of independence 
(as proposed by the Bougainville negotiating 
position), if the referendum vote was to be in favour of 
independence then the parties would consult, with a 
view to finding agreement on the way forward. Hence 
although the referendum would not be binding, the 
national government could not simply ignore it. The 
PNG government would be constitutionally obligated 
to consult with the Bougainville leadership about the 
referendum results.
The compromise proposal was accepted mainly 
because it offered both parties an escape from the 
possible collapse of the talks and a likely consequential 
crisis. It did so through arrangements that gave 
each party a significant part of what they sought. 
Bougainville achieved a constitutionally guaranteed 
referendum, and after 18 months of tense negotiations 
the leaders realised what a significant achievement that 
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available to allocate to development projects at its 
discretion. The failure, over about eight years now, to 
resolve the ABG’s concerns about the restoration grant 
have undoubtedly contributed to strained relations 
between the ABG and the national government. These 
strained relationships suggest a failure on the part of 
the national government to grasp the opportunities 
inherent in the combination of asymmetrical autonomy 
and a deferred referendum.
The referendum in Bougainville’s politics after 2001
As mentioned earlier in this paper, when the joint 
Bougainville negotiating position was being negotiated 
in mid-1999, just before the negotiations for the 
BPA began, the moderate Bougainvillean leadership 
was divided on the question of independence, and 
whether and when there should be a referendum 
on independence. Many of those who supported a 
referendum deferred for an extended period took that 
position because of fears of domination of a post-
referendum by the BRA, and some form of repetition of 
the chaotic situation that arose after the withdrawal of 
the PNG forces from Bougainville in March 1990. The 
establishment of the ABG in 2005 through a peaceful 
election, followed by two more general elections 
(2010 and 2015) and a Bougainville-wide presidential 
by-election late in 2008, and the lack of interference by 
former combatants (BRA or BRF) in the operation of 
the ABG has changed attitudes towards the referendum 
and probably towards independence. However, in the 
absence of any form of opinion polling in Bougainville, 
it is impossible to assess the extent of support for either 
independence or integration, or the degree of change in 
levels of support for both positions.
As for those who in 1999 were refusing to 
support the peace process, as already noted, Ona and 
some BRA elements had refused to join the peace 
process in 1997, and by early 1998 were claiming 
to be the true government of Bougainville through 
Ona’s proclamation of the Republic of Me‘ekamui. 
Throughout the negotiation of the BPA and the early 
period of its implementation, Ona was a strident 
critic of the whole peace process and claimed that the 
referendum proposal was actually a trick on the part 
of the PNG government, intended to divert attention 
from the status of independence that he claimed had 
already been attained through his UDI of 17 May 1990. 
Soon after the ABG was established, however, Ona 
the Bougainville referendum. As a result there are 
those in PNG who feel it is not necessary to treat 
Bougainville too much as a special case, because even 
if the Bougainvilleans become disgruntled with their 
treatment by PNG, they will not have an enforceable 
right to separation even after a majority vote for 
independence. Further, PNG has much less freedom 
to move than France has in terms of making special 
provision for New Caledonia, especially in provision 
of funding. Most of the provinces that constitute the 
rest of PNG have similar claims in relation to lack 
of adequate funding from the centre to those that 
Bougainville makes. Particularly in the period of 
low commodity prices since the advent of the global 
financial crisis, special treatment for Bougainville 
in terms of funding could have resulted in strained 
relations for the centre with provinces elsewhere in the 
country. Hence although the autonomy arrangements 
are definitely designed to be asymmetrical — applicable 
only to Bougainville and not to the provinces elsewhere 
in PNG — there is clearly pressure on the PNG 
government to reduce the extent of asymmetry. 
Whatever the reasons, there has been real 
disappointment in Bougainville with the progress in 
implementation of the autonomy arrangements, both 
in terms of the pace at which powers and functions 
have been transferred from the national government 
and the flow of funding from the national government 
to the ABG. The most serious problems with funding 
relate to the payment of one of the two main annual 
grants payable to the ABG by the national government 
— the restoration and development grant. In a conflict 
running since about 2010, the ABG has been claiming 
serious underpayment of this grant, resulting from 
a failure by PNG to calculate the amount payable 
annually on the basis of the formula in section 49 of 
the Organic Law on Peace-building in Bougainville 
— Autonomous Bougainville Government and 
Bougainville Referendum. On the ABG’s calculations, 
the amount of the annual grant should be around K70 
million,  as opposed to the K15 million annual payment 
usually provided in the national budget, and arrears of 
payment amount to in excess of K700 million. 
As the other main grant — the recurrent 
unconditional grant — meets the costs of the functions 
and powers vested in the ABG and so is in essence tied 
to meeting the costs of the existing ABG functions 
and powers, the restoration and development grant 
is of great importance if the ABG is to have funding 
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might eventually take action against U-Vistract 
and the supposed Kingdom of Papala. (For more 
about U-Vistract, the Kingdom of Papala and Noah 
Musingku, see Cox 2014; Regan 2010:117–26.)
Conclusions
This brief history of the background to and negotiation 
of the referendum arrangements highlights how the 
BPA is the product of a hard-won and thoroughly 
evaluated compromise between opposing parties, 
each with strong views on the issues involved. The 
compromise was intended to provide a careful balance 
between the interests and concerns of all parties.
A conflict that originally concerned mainly the 
distribution of mining revenue amongst affected 
Bougainvilleans and to the Bougainville provincial 
government, and brought together a broad coalition of 
Bougainville groups, was transformed by PNG security 
force violence from late 1988 to early 1990 into a 
broad-based secessionist conflict. The fairly generalised 
but not intense movement for secession before the 
conflict was transformed by the BRA and its support 
base into an intense cause. However, from mid-1990, 
intra-Bougainville conflict emerged which reduced the 
breadth of secessionist support as opposition to the 
BRA developed. But even as some support for the PNG 
forces emerged, the ongoing conflict between the BRA 
and PNG forces undoubtedly deepened the support for 
secession amongst the BRA and its support base. By 
the time the peace process began in mid-1997 not only 
was there a significant proportion of Bougainvilleans 
supporting independence, but they also had little sense 
of the extent of opposition to independence amongst 
the BTG and the BRF and their support base.
For the national government, by mid-1997, the 
combination of the experience of not only the serious 
problems for the security forces in the intensification 
of violence in 1996 but also of the Sandline affair 
(which showed that the use of mercenaries to defeat 
the BRA would not succeed) finally made it clear that 
a military victory over the BRA was most unlikely. 
The development of the combined Bougainville 
negotiation position which proposed dealing with 
the independence issue through a referendum put 
the national government in a difficult position. It 
desperately wanted peace, and was under international 
community pressure to achieve that goal. But it took 
18 months of tough negotiations to get to the point 
died quite unexpectedly in July 2005. In the aftermath 
of his death, the Me‘ekamui leadership split into two 
main factions and some associated semi-independent 
locally based groups. One of the main factions, calling 
itself the Me‘ekamui Government of Unity, began 
working with the ABG from about 2007, resulting in 
restoration of ABG government services in much of 
what had previously been a Me‘ekamui-imposed no-go-
zone in areas around the mine and down to the main 
Buka–Arawa road. Nevertheless, even the Me‘ekamui 
Government of Unity maintained a degree of 
separation from the ABG and continued to be sceptical 
about the possibility of a referendum. (For more on the 
post-Ona Me‘ekamui leadership movement, see Regan 
2010:114–17.)
This situation continued until about 2016, when it 
became increasingly clear that the national government 
was beginning to engage in a serious way with the ABG 
about the referendum. The first real progress towards 
organising the referendum began at the May 2016 
Joint Supervisory Body (JSB). From then on there has 
been a growing acceptance amongst the Me‘ekamui 
leadership that the referendum will really occur, and 
this change has manifested itself in the agreement by 
the Me‘ekamui factions to a new weapons disposal 
programme.
The most significant leadership element refusing 
to commit to working with the ABG in relation to the 
referendum is yet another group claiming to be the 
legitimate government of Bougainville — the Kingdom 
of Papala, headed by the self-appointed claimant to 
the monarchy, Noah Musingku. Musingku first came 
to public attention in 1998 in Port Moresby as head of 
a major Ponzi scheme, called U-Vistract, and fled to 
his home province of Bougainville in 2003 to escape 
warrants for his arrest arising from legal proceedings 
in relation to the failure of U-Vistract to pay hundreds 
of millions owing to investors in the scheme. Initially 
based at Guava village with Francis Ona, Musingku fell 
out with Ona in mid-2004 and went to his home area of 
Tonu in Siwai, and from there has developed his claims 
about monarchy and the imminent payouts of the huge 
sums owed by U-Vistract. In 2018 it is widely reported 
that Musingku is opposed to the referendum, on the 
grounds that Bougainville is already independent, and 
that he seeks to discourage his supporters from even 
enrolling to vote. The speculation of many observers 
is that Musingku really opposes the referendum 
because of fear that an ABG with growing legitimacy 
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Central Bougainville. PhD Thesis, University of Hawai‘i.
Hayes, J. 2005. Bringing Peace to Bougainville. In J. 
Henderson and G. Watson (eds). Securing a Peaceful 
Pacific. Christchurch: Canterbury University Press,140–49.
Kigina, B. 1984. The Rural Injustices Experienced in the 
North Solomons. Unpublished paper prepared for Justice 
and Peace Consultation, Noumea, 8–14 October. 
Laracy, H. 1991. Bougainville Secessionism. Journal de la 
Société des Océanistes 92-93:53–59.
where the national government negotiators realised that 
without a referendum on independence, there would be 
no peace agreement and that there was a formulation 
for a referendum that the national government might 
just be able to live with.
The combination of a deferred referendum 
together with asymmetrical autonomy arrangements 
for Bougainville gave the national government 
the opportunity of normalising relationships with 
Bougainville and reducing the intensity of support for 
secession. However PNG has not been willing to make 
the special arrangements for Bougainville included 
in the autonomy arrangements work as intended, 
perhaps in part because its right to reject a vote in the 
referendum in favour of independence reduces its need 
to treat Bougainville as a special case compared to 
provinces elsewhere in PNG.
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Endnotes
1.  The full text of the Bougainville Peace Agreement is 
available on a number of websites, for example on the 
United States Institute for Peace website.
2. Leo Hannett 10/10/2010, personal communication.
3. For more on the Bana pressure group, see Regan 
2017:380–81.
4. Dennis Kuiai 10/6/2018, personal communication.
5. There are no reliable estimates of the number of deaths, 
mainly because no records are available, particularly 
for deaths of BRA personnel, extra-judicial killings and 
deaths attributed to the blockade. For a discussion of the 
difficulties with the data, see Braithwaite et al. 2010:83–92.
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